Tên
Peter Kien-Hong Yu, THE CHINESE U-SHAPED LINE IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA: POINTS, LINES, AND ZONES.
Mô tả
Contemporary Southeast Asia , Dec, 2003 "...When sovereignty, however, is at issue and areas such as baselines and EEZs are under threat, we can expect both China and Taiwan to stand firm. Nationalism and the sentiments associated with it will be invoked to shore up defence. This does not mean that the PRC wishes to be perceived as a bully. Indeed, as the following statement, made in August 1990 in Singapore, by its former Prime Minister Li Peng indicates, mainland China is keen to be seen as a willing team player: "China is ready to join efforts with Southeast Asian countries to develop the [Nansha] islands while putting aside for the time being the dispute (gezhizhengyi gongtongkaifa)." (106) In order to facilitate this, the mainland and Taiwan may have to make an interim designation of certain sea lanes as "high seas corridors" within the U-shaped line. Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Finland have already led by example, choosing to reduce their territorial seas from 12 miles to 3 to avoid transit passage issues. (107) Another possibility could be to imitate the Peruvian "maritime domain"--which expressly recognizes freedoms of navigation and overflight. Waters not contained within areas such as EEZs or contiguous zones could be included in such a "maritime domain" in the SCS. (108) To put it differently, such waters could constitute a sui generis zone for a period of time. These cooperative possibilities are quite the opposite of what some have called the (potential) "Tibetization" of the SCS. (109) The growth of literature on boundary-making takes the final quarter of the 19th century as its starting point and this article can be seen as simply adding to a growing body of work. (110) Valencia, in Malaysia and the Law of the Sea, makes his dedication to the children of Malaysia, whom he says will suffer if Kuala Lumpur does not manage its maritime affairs wisely. (111) I would like to appropriate this sentiment for the Chinese people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. We need to manage our maritime affairs wisely. So long as other disputants hold on to what they occupy, it is inconceivable that Taiwan and mainland China will relinquish their hold on the U-shaped line in the foreseeable future. Quite apart from questions of national interest, such an act would open up a veritable Pandora's Box as various countries scramble to fill the vacuum and lay claim to natural resources..."
