Cooperation in the South China Sea: from Dispute Management to Ocean Governance

Thang NGUYEN DANG*

The problems of ocean space are closely interrelated and need to be considered as a whole.¹

1. Introduction

The South China Sea (SCS) has long been of interest to scholars of international law and international relations.² But attention has been paid almost exclusively to the simmering territorial disputes in the SCS. While this is justified by the concern that such disputes pose a threat to regional peace and stability, that the management of the territorial disputes in the SCS dominates existing literature may belie the fact that problems associated with the use and management of oceans in general and the South China Sea in particular are interrelated and should be addressed in a holistic way. This paper canvasses for a more comprehensive approach to cooperation in the SCS through the prism of ocean governance.

The paper, besides the Introduction and Conclusions, contains four sections. Section 2 highlights the significance of the South China Sea. This is followed by a brief overview in Section 3 of the territorial disputes and their implications for the management of the SCS. Section 4 points out the shortcoming of the two existing approaches to the management of the SCS and Section 5 mentions some principles that inform an alternative approach to the SCS, that is ocean governance.

2. The significance of the SCS

The SCS – the second largest semi-enclosed sea in the world – is bordered by China (including Taiwan) and eight ASEAN countries, namely the Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. As part of the most direct route between the Pacific and Indian Oceans, the SCS plays a crucial role in maritime trade of our globe.

serving as the crucial conduit for more than a quarter of the world’s trade volume.\textsuperscript{3} Thus, the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) through the SCS are of great importance to not only Southeast Asian coastal states but also states beyond the region. In fact, most of maritime traffic between East Asia and Europe, Africa, the Middle East and South Asia passes through the SCS.\textsuperscript{4} By the same token, the SCS is also significant in military terms, especially for naval powers who want to maintain or increase their global military posture and rely on the SCS transit corridors for rapid deployments between the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean.\textsuperscript{5}

In addition to the geo-strategic importance, the SCS is vital to the developing economies of countries in the region as it holds a large number of assets, notably living and non-living resources. With regard to the latter, there is also widespread perception that the seabed of the SCS holds significant amounts of oil and gas. This is testified by significant commercial discoveries made at the margins of the SCS.\textsuperscript{6} Given their increasing energy demands and the surging oil prices, the oil factor arguably looms large in the geopolitical calculations of states in the region. Living resources in the SCS are abundant\textsuperscript{7} and most of the fisheries resources in the SCS are either highly migratory or transboundary stocks,\textsuperscript{8} such as scad, mackerel and especially tuna – the most valuable and sought-after species.\textsuperscript{9} The abundance of marine living resources in SCS is thanks to its high biodiversity\textsuperscript{10} with coral reefs being the important nursery and breeding grounds for regional fisheries.

The socio-economic importance of fisheries to the East Asian countries cannot be overestimated. In fact, fish has been and continues providing an important source of protein for


\textsuperscript{4} G Kullenberg, 'Transportation across the Sea' in C Thia-Eng and others (eds), \textit{Securing the Oceans: Essays on Ocean Governance} (GEF/UNDP/IMO Regional Programme on Building Partnerships in Environmental Management for the Seas of East Asia (PEMSEA) and the Nippon Foundation, Quezon City, 2008), ch 4, 41, 49. See also Schofield, \textit{supra}, 18, states that 70% of Japan’s energy needs and 65% of China’s pass through these SLOS.

\textsuperscript{5} Schofield and Storey, \textit{supra}, 1.

\textsuperscript{6} See Table 3. The oil and gas potential of the central part of the SCS, however, remains speculative ‘best guesstimate’ due to the lack of sufficient exploration activities. See Schofield, \textit{supra}, 15-6.

\textsuperscript{7} The SCS, flushed by several large rivers, is considered as one of the world’s most productive fishing grounds. See D Rosenberg, 'Fisheries Management in the South China Sea' in S Bateman and R Emmers (eds), \textit{Security and International Politics in the South China Sea: Towards a Co-operative Management Regime} (London: Routledge, 2009) 61. T Kivima ki (ed), \textit{War or peace in the South China Sea?} (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2002) at 44, ranks the SCS 4\textsuperscript{th} in the 19 richest fishing zones in the world.

\textsuperscript{8} K-H Wang, 'Bridge over troubled waters: fisheries cooperation as a resolution to the South China Sea conflicts' (2001) 14(4) \textit{The Pacific Review} 531, 535-36.

\textsuperscript{9} Rosenberg, \textit{supra}, 62.

\textsuperscript{10} PEMSEA (Partnerships in Environmental Management for the Seas of East Asia), \textit{Sustainable Development Strategy for the Seas of East Asia: Regional Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development Requirements for the Coasts and Oceans}, 2003, 16, states that the SCS is “the global centre of marine shallow-water tropical biodiversity”.


countries in the region.\textsuperscript{11} The already high annual per capita fish consumption in China and Southeast Asia is estimated to increase from 33.6 million and 18 million tons in 2005 by 4.5-5.5 million and 3 million tones respectively after 10 years.\textsuperscript{12} Fisheries have always been of great social importance to East Asian countries, creating jobs for a large portion of population living in the coastal sub-region. In fact, in 2010, the SCS countries accounted for more than 75% and approximately 49% of the total marine fish capture production of Asia and the world respectively.\textsuperscript{13} Economically speaking, fishery exports are an important source of foreign currency for coastal states.\textsuperscript{14}

3. Territorial disputes and their implications for the management of the SCS

There are generally two types of territorial disputes in the South China Sea,\textsuperscript{15} the one relating to island sovereignty and the other to maritime boundaries (Figure 1). With regard to the former, the two most famous ones are the sovereignty disputes over two groups of islands, namely the Paracels and the Spratlys.\textsuperscript{16} The Paracels, a group of some thirty small islands, reefs and shoals situated to the central north of the SCS, forms the subject of a bilateral dispute between Vietnam and China (including Taiwan);\textsuperscript{17} the Spratlys, a group of over a hundred tiny islands, reefs and shoals scattering over a large area in the centre of the SCS, involves six claimants, i.e. Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam and Taiwan. A more recent island sovereignty dispute, which has nevertheless increasingly drawn attention of the international community, is that between China and the Philippines over the ring-shaped Scarborough Reef which comprises several rocks to the north of the Spratlys and lies about 124 nm off the nearest coast of the Philippines.\textsuperscript{18}

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{11} Rosenberg, supra, 62. See FAO, \textit{The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture 2008} (Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2009) at 154.
\item\textsuperscript{12} See FAO, \textit{ibid.} at 171, 172.
\item\textsuperscript{13} See Table 1 for greater details.
\item\textsuperscript{14} See Table 2.
\item\textsuperscript{15} Depending on how the Chinese Government articulates its claim (it has so far refrained from doing so), there might exist another dispute relating to the \textit{infamous} nine-dashed-line map, which was officially introduced by China to the international community for the first time in May 2009 in its \textit{Notes Verbales} sent to the UN Secretary-General to protest against the unilateral and joint submissions by Malaysia and Vietnam of their extended continental shelf claims in the SCS to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf.
\item\textsuperscript{16} For these two disputes, see generally, R Emmers, \textit{Geopolitics and maritime territorial disputes in East Asia} (Routledge, London, 2009), ch 4.
\item\textsuperscript{17} In this paper, Taiwan is considered as a province of China, which is consistent with the ‘one-China’ policy of ASEAN countries. However, in the context of the Spratlys dispute, Taiwan is considered as a disputant on its own given its occupation of the largest feature of the Spratlys.
\end{itemize}
The geographic character of the SCS is such that myriad overlapping maritime zones have been created between the coastal states.\(^\text{19}\) Thanks to good will and ingenuity, some of these have been delimited by maritime boundary agreements\(^\text{20}\) or managed though innovative provisional...


\(^{20}\) See *ibid*. Most of the delimitation agreements concluded by SCS countries have been reported and analysed in the *International Maritime Boundaries* series (now in six volumes) of the American Society of International Law (Region VI).
arrangements of practical nature, primarily joint petroleum development agreements. Yet, a large number of maritime boundary disputes remain.

It should be noted that while island sovereignty disputes and maritime boundary disputes are distinct and susceptible to different bodies of law, they are interrelated. Indeed, the sovereignty dispute over an island may become preliminary to the maritime delimitation process if that island itself gives rise to overlapping maritime entitlement. Because of this, there appears a legal dispute between some of the SCS states over the interpretation and application of Article 121 of the LOS Convention to the Spratlys. China considers the features of the Spratlys as ‘islands’ under Article 121, i.e. they are capable of having an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and continental shelf, while other states consider them as ‘rocks’, which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of its own and can only be entitled to a 12 nm territorial sea. The reason for treating the features of the Spratlys as ‘islands’ under Article 121 is not difficult to understand. As Schofield makes a shrewd observation, the minuscule features of the Spratlys have little intrinsic value in themselves, what is significant is their potential to generate large maritime zones and hence entitle China, which otherwise lacks legal basis, to exploit marine natural resources therein by virtue of its claim of title to the islands.

It should also be noted in passing that if the features in the Spratlys (and the Paracels) were considered as ‘islands’ under Article 121 of the LOS Convention, there would be no high seas in the

---

24 Schofield, supra, 12-8.
South China Sea. In other words, the centre of the SCS would fall under the regime of the exclusive economic zone of the Spratlys.

The tangle of island and maritime boundary disputes creates serious problems for the use and management of the SCS which predicate upon the delineation of the coastal state’s maritime jurisdictional zones. The absence of well defined maritime boundaries might have repercussions for the management of fisheries in the SCS. In the same vein, the protection in the SCS marine environment is also fraught will difficulties. Conventional wisdom has it that to better manage the SCS, different schemes for the allocation of jurisdiction and enforcement responsibility between coastal states should be devised. These schemes have thus far been effected by either maritime delimitation agreement or provisional arrangement of practical nature. Neither of these is, unfortunately, in place for a large part of the SCS.

4. Existing cooperative approaches to the SCS

There are arguably two major approaches to cooperation in the South China Sea. The first one is pursued through the so-called Track I diplomacy, i.e. by official negotiations between ASEAN on the one hand and China on the other. The initial result of this process is the so-called Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea in 2002 (DOC) which serves as a confidence building measure with a view to preventing possible conflicts that might arise from the island disputes in the SCS. The implementation of this political document is, however, a daunting process and the DOC is far from being effective in reducing tensions over the disputed islands in the South China Sea. ASEAN is now urging China to negotiate a Code of Conduct in the SCS which is expected to be binding and contain more stringent compliance mechanism. Nevertheless, as seen from their context, both the DOC and the future COC manifest a reactive approach to cooperation between SCS countries—they are negotiated to respond to the rising tensions over the disputed islands in the SCS. Consequently, they are limited in geographical scope.


27 It took nine years for ASEAN and China to agree to the Guidelines for the implementation of the DOC.


29 ASEAN has reached agreement on the elements of a future COC. For a discussion of these elements, see CA Thayer, 'ASEAN’S Code of Conduct in the South China Sea: A Litmus Test for Community-Building?', The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus No 34/4, 20 August 2012.

30 For a background to the DOC, see HT Nguyen, 'Vietnam and the Code of Conduct for the South China Sea' (2001) 32 ODIL 105.
The second approach which is arguably more proactive than the DOC/COC approach has been canvassed extensively in academic writings. The solution most frequently suggested so far is joint development, particularly with regard to oil and gas. According to this solution, claimant states will put aside their territorial claims to engage in a cooperative undertaking in the exploration and exploitation of hydrocarbon resources.\textsuperscript{31} On the face of it, such a proposal is attractive, apparently given the increasing energy demand of countries in the region and the ostensible lure of oil and gas potential of the SCS. A practical implementation of this approach is the Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking (JMSU) between national oil companies of China, the Philippines and Vietnam in 2005 which was once hailed as a “historic event” or “a breakthrough” in the cooperation among parties to the Spratly Islands dispute.\textsuperscript{32} The JMSU is, however, a stillborn: no concrete result has been revealed and no follow-up actions undertaken upon the completion of the project.\textsuperscript{33} It should also be noted that cooperation in ‘disputed areas’ is highly sensitive insofar as claimant states remain adamant that they have undisputed sovereignty over the area in question.\textsuperscript{34} Furthermore, while the joint development agreement – a popular type of provisional arrangement in contested waters – is invariably equipped with a ‘without prejudice’ clause,\textsuperscript{35} thus safeguarding the respective positions of the parties, the legal effect of such a provision is not easily explained to the uninitiated. Finally, joint development, functional as it is, is often resource-specific, either oil and gas or fisheries but rarely both.\textsuperscript{36} In other words, such cooperation is limited as far as its subject matter is concerned.

The foregoing demonstrates the shortcoming of the existing approaches to cooperation in the SCS: they are limited either in their geographical scope or with regard to their subject matter. It is


\textsuperscript{33} See C Schofield and I Townsend-Gault, ‘Brokering Cooperation Amidst Competing Maritime Claims: Preventative Diplomacy in the Gulf of Thailand and South China Sea’ in AE Chircop and others (eds), \textit{The future of ocean regime-building: Essays in tribute to Douglas M Johnston} (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 2009), 643, 665, stating that the result has been disappointed.

\textsuperscript{34} See Schofield and Storey,\textit{ supra}, 24-5, for the controversy within the Philippines over the constitutionality of the JMSU.

\textsuperscript{35} See LOS Convention, Arts 74(3) and 83(3).

\textsuperscript{36} The reason is not difficult to understand: living and non-living resources are subject to different rules under international law. See R Lagoni, ‘Report on Joint Development of Non-living Resources in the Exclusive Economic Zone’ (1988) 63 \textit{International Law Association Reports} 509, 511; H Fox and others, \textit{Joint Development of Offshore Oil and Gas: Model Agreement for States for Joint Development with Explanatory Commentary} (Vol 1, British Institute of International and Comparative Law, London, 1989), 12-3. The management and exploitation of living resources is also different from that of the oil industry.
suggested that a holistic approach to cooperation in the SCS should be adopted and this can be achieved with the concept of ocean governance.

5. An ocean governance approach to the SCS

The ocean governance has become a current term for several decades.\textsuperscript{37} It underscores the fact that ocean affairs are, as pointed out in the epigraph, closely interrelated and hence need to be addressed altogether. For instance, petroleum exploitation activities and navigation carry with them potential environmental hazards, threatening the marine environment. Marine environmental protection is, however, a \textit{quid pro quo} for effective fisheries management and marine biological diversity. The regulation of fishing activities is, on the other hand, essential for the conservation of marine biological diversity. Indeed, the interrelatedness of these ocean use activities is evident in the context of the SCS.\textsuperscript{38}

The interplay between marine issues calls for a comprehensive treatment. It has been suggested that effective global ocean governance requires that nation-states relinquish significant sovereign power and authority to supranational organizations for the broader social good.\textsuperscript{39} Ideal as it is, such a view is hardly plausible given the territorial obsession of the members of the international community modelled upon the Westphalian conception—territorial exclusivity remains the order of the day. This is especially true for Asian countries.

The legal framework for ocean governance remains that based on the so-called zonal approach according to which the ocean space is partitioned into various maritime zones subject to different legal regimes. Thus, the LOS Convention – the most important legal instrument governing almost if not all activities at sea – provides for a multitude of maritime areas within coastal state exclusive competence and the areas beyond national jurisdiction where states enjoy equally unfettered freedoms.

On the other hand, the LOS Convention, without mentioning ‘ocean governance’, arguably contains the principles that inform an integrated approach to the management of the oceans. As the Constitution for the Oceans, the LOS Convention also lays the groundwork for the further development of norms and principles of ocean governance. It is beyond the scope of this paper to


discuss in details these norms and principles. Some concepts particularly relevant to the SCS could be identified, however.

As far as the SCS is concerned, Article 123 of the LOS Convention on ‘Cooperation of States bordering enclosed or semi-enclosed seas’ must come to mind first. While Article 123 as such is far from imposing an obligation to cooperate,\(^{40}\) it undoubtedly highlights the need for cooperation between the coastal states bordering an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea where activities of one state may impact on the rights and interests of others. On the other hand, the principle of cooperation is a long-standing one in general international law as well as in the international law of the sea, particularly in the fields of fisheries management\(^{41}\) and pollution prevention.\(^{42}\)

All SCS coastal states, except Cambodia, have become parties to the LOS Convention and hence are under a general obligation to properly conserve and manage the living resources in the exclusive economic zone.\(^{43}\) Depending on how the insular features in the SCS are characterized under Article 121 of the LOS Convention, different legal duties to cooperate with regard to the conservation and development of transboundary fish stocks will enter the picture. If there are no high seas in the SCS (that is, most of the SCS become the exclusive economic zones of the coastal states), Article 63(1) provides for an obligation to cooperate with regard to fish stocks, which in this case migrate between the exclusive economic zones of two states or more. Article 63(2), on the other hand, requires a coastal state in the SCS to cooperate with the states fishing for the stocks which occur both within the exclusive economic zone of the former and in an area beyond and adjacent to the zone, i.e. the high seas. (Arguably, the first states that fish on these possible high seas in are the SCS coastal states.) Furthermore, should there be high seas in the SCS, Section 2 of Part VII of the LOS Convention contains five articles which require states, individually or jointly as appropriate, to conserve and manage the living resources in the areas of the high seas. These provisions of the LOS Convention have also been supplemented by, \textit{inter alia}, the 1995 Fish Stocks

\(^{40}\) Article 123 reads:
States bordering an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea should cooperate with each other in the exercise of their rights and in the performance of their duties under this Convention. To this end they shall endeavour, directly or through an appropriate regional organization:
(a) to coordinate the management, conservation, exploration and exploitation of the living resources of the sea;
(b) to coordinate the implementation of their rights and duties with respect to the protection and preservation of the marine environment;
(c) to coordinate their scientific research policies and undertake where appropriate joint programmes of scientific research in the area;
(d) to invite, as appropriate, other interested States or international organizations to cooperate with them in furtherance of the provisions of this article.
The word ‘should’ in the first sentence indicates an ‘hortatory’ language while the second sentence with the word ‘shall’ denotes a legal duty (though the verb ‘endeavour’ arguably leaves room for interpretation).

\(^{41}\) See infra.

\(^{42}\) See MOX Plant (Ireland v United Kingdom) (Provisional Measure) 41 \textit{ILM} 405, para 82 (‘the duty to cooperate is a fundamental principle in the prevention of pollution of the marine environment under Part XII of the [LOS Convention] and general international law’).

\(^{43}\) See LOS Convention, Article 61.
Agreement,\textsuperscript{44} the 1995 FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries\textsuperscript{45} and the 2001 FAO Plan of Action for IUU Fishing.\textsuperscript{46} It is submitted that these instruments are not as such binding upon all the SCS states either because they lack of the necessary ratification of the SCS state\textsuperscript{47} or because they are only soft law documents. The instruments present a possible policy and legal framework that the SCS states should take into consideration in pursuing sustainable fisheries. It should be noted that implicit in the duty to conserve marine living resources is the adoption of precautionary principle\textsuperscript{48} by using ‘the best scientific evidence available’ to prevent over-exploitation or to determine the total allowable catch.\textsuperscript{49} Consequently, there is no longer a right to engage in unlimited fishing, be it within the exclusive economic zone or on the high seas.

In addition to the above obligations concerning fisheries, the LOS Convention also contains an essential principle of ocean governance, that is, environmental protection.\textsuperscript{50} A number of principles and measures to operationalize this general principle of environmental protection are catalogued in Part XII of the LOS Convention,\textsuperscript{51} an important one being the principle of preventing transboundary harm.\textsuperscript{52} Furthermore, the LOS Convention has provided a legal framework for the implementation of contemporary principles of environmental protection, notable among which is, again, the precautionary principle. This principle is supplemented by a procedure for evaluating the likely environmental effects of any proposed activity at sea\textsuperscript{53} – so-called ‘environmental impact assessment’ (EIA). The whole tenor of the precautionary principle and EIA is a requirement that any state who wants to undertake new developments engages in scientific studies to determine the environmental effect of its initiatives and also considers less intrusive alternative approaches.\textsuperscript{54}

An ocean governance approach to the SCS, on its face, has little to offer with regard to the simmering territorial disputes in the SCS. It is not about the management of dispute, much less its resolution. Rather all the principles embedded in the concept of ocean governance as briefly

\begin{itemize}
\item Available at \url{http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/v9878e/v9878e00.HTM}.
\item 2001 FAO International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, available at \url{http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/y1224e/y1224e00.htm}.
\item Among SCS states, only Indonesia has become party to the 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement.
\item The precautionary principle defies definition. See generally, JM Van Dyke, 'The Evolution and International Acceptance of the Precautionary Principle' in DD Caron and HN Scheiber (eds), \emph{Bringing New Law to Ocean Waters} (Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, 2004), ch 15, 357. For the implication of the principle, see \textit{infra}.
\item See LOS Convention, Articles 61(2) and 119 (1).
\item LOS Convention, Article 192.
\item Part XII seeks to address all sources of marine pollution, refers to the latest international rules and standards concerning environmental protection and provides for the enforcement capacity of three different types of states, namely port, flag and coastal states.
\item LOS Convention, Article 194(2). This principle is widely recognized as an obligation of customary law.
\item See Van Dyke, \textit{supra}, 359.
\item \emph{Ibid}, 359. See also N Craik, \emph{The International Law of Environmental Impact Assessment} (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008), 4.
\end{itemize}
reviewed above aim at sustainable use of the SCS. But is sustainable use of the SCS a lofty goal to pursue? The answer must be in an emphatic YES. Indeed, when one, if not the, cause for the territorial disputes in the SCS is the desire to grasp the natural resources and exploit them, it is perfectly sensible that they can be exploited in a sustainable way.

That said, it is naïve to talk about ocean governance in the SCS without touching upon the territorial disputes in the SCS. Since the operative framework for ocean management remains, as indicated above, based on a zonal approach, partitioning the SCS is unavoidable. But the from the perspective of ocean governance, the management of the territorial disputes in the SCS is bettered conceived of as a means, not an end. In other words, an ocean approach to the SCS gives further impetus for an early management of the disputes in the SCS. This is the merit of an ocean governance approach to the SCS as far as the territorial disputes are concerned.

6. Conclusion

This paper calls for a more holistic approach to the management and use of the SCS by adopting the concept of ocean governance. It emphasizes the need for cooperation between the coastal states, not least for the sake of sustainable use of the SCS. To this extent, there is a paradigm shift in the perception of the raison d’être for cooperation of the SCS. Cooperation is not so much about management of the territorial disputes as about sustainable use of the SCS.

Of course, in establishing a proper management regime for the SCS, the notorious territorial disputes in the SCS should be addressed. Yet it should be noted that this is but an element, essential though it may be, in the SCS governance regime. There are other principles that underlie the management of the SCS, the most significant among which is arguably the precautionary principle. Indeed, this principle preserves the sustainability of the marine natural resources. The application of this principle means that we abandon both the reactive and proactive approaches in favour of an anticipatory approach to the management of the SCS.
Table 1: Marine Fish Capture Production (in tonnes) in marine areas of SCS countries in comparison with Asia and the world between 2000-10

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Land Area</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brunei</td>
<td>2 558</td>
<td>1 639</td>
<td>2 112</td>
<td>1 854</td>
<td>2 510</td>
<td>3 137</td>
<td>2 734</td>
<td>3 160</td>
<td>2 826</td>
<td>2 192</td>
<td>2 758</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>39 176</td>
<td>47 094</td>
<td>49 946</td>
<td>63 931</td>
<td>73 357</td>
<td>78 890</td>
<td>68 670</td>
<td>64 790</td>
<td>67 560</td>
<td>76 940</td>
<td>87 214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>27 809</td>
<td>28 170</td>
<td>29 191</td>
<td>30 186</td>
<td>31 630</td>
<td>32 146</td>
<td>32 655</td>
<td>33 226</td>
<td>33 853</td>
<td>35 042</td>
<td>36 592</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>4 014</td>
<td>4 205</td>
<td>4 309</td>
<td>4 589</td>
<td>4 717</td>
<td>5 340</td>
<td>5 703</td>
<td>6 486</td>
<td>6 890</td>
<td>7 804</td>
<td>9 067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>1 390</td>
<td>1 341</td>
<td>1 389</td>
<td>1 403</td>
<td>1 451</td>
<td>1 333</td>
<td>1 416</td>
<td>1 538</td>
<td>1 605</td>
<td>1 647</td>
<td>1 771</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>2 494</td>
<td>2 644</td>
<td>2 839</td>
<td>3 075</td>
<td>3 347</td>
<td>3 550</td>
<td>3 728</td>
<td>3 962</td>
<td>4 178</td>
<td>4 279</td>
<td>4 363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>9 823</td>
<td>7 083</td>
<td>7 180</td>
<td>6 507</td>
<td>7 030</td>
<td>7 235</td>
<td>11 249</td>
<td>7 681</td>
<td>8 589</td>
<td>5 407</td>
<td>8 821</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>2 956</td>
<td>2 890</td>
<td>3 041</td>
<td>3 026</td>
<td>3 013</td>
<td>2 979</td>
<td>2 817</td>
<td>2 401</td>
<td>1 947</td>
<td>1 983</td>
<td>1 904</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viet Nam</td>
<td>1 468</td>
<td>1 551</td>
<td>1 675</td>
<td>1 777</td>
<td>1 918</td>
<td>1 964</td>
<td>2 007</td>
<td>2 084</td>
<td>2 158</td>
<td>29733</td>
<td>2 435</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>40 185</td>
<td>40 860</td>
<td>42 506</td>
<td>44 131</td>
<td>46 161</td>
<td>47 404</td>
<td>48 411</td>
<td>49 776</td>
<td>50 707</td>
<td>53 140</td>
<td>56 229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>57 178</td>
<td>57 855</td>
<td>59 382</td>
<td>61 363</td>
<td>63 003</td>
<td>64 292</td>
<td>66 152</td>
<td>68 153</td>
<td>69 237</td>
<td>71 380</td>
<td>74 655</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>107 201</td>
<td>105 723</td>
<td>107 580</td>
<td>112 287</td>
<td>112 605</td>
<td>111 190</td>
<td>112 809</td>
<td>113 189</td>
<td>114 922</td>
<td>115 334</td>
<td>115 334</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Export value (in thousand USD) of SCS countries in comparison with Asia and the world between 2000 - 09

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Land Area</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brunei</td>
<td>296 F</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>459</td>
<td>706</td>
<td>683 F</td>
<td>1 053 F</td>
<td>5 305</td>
<td>3 238 F</td>
<td>2 398 F</td>
<td>356 F</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>34 469</td>
<td>32 114</td>
<td>36 284</td>
<td>37 816</td>
<td>42 400</td>
<td>48 551</td>
<td>26 835</td>
<td>23 285</td>
<td>24 679</td>
<td>30 362</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>3 706</td>
<td>4 106</td>
<td>4 600</td>
<td>5 362</td>
<td>6 779</td>
<td>7 674</td>
<td>9 150</td>
<td>9 450</td>
<td>10 356</td>
<td>10 473</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>1 610</td>
<td>1 560</td>
<td>1 516</td>
<td>1 579</td>
<td>1 736</td>
<td>1 845</td>
<td>2 019</td>
<td>2 170</td>
<td>2 600</td>
<td>2 349</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>200 469</td>
<td>220 126</td>
<td>381 983</td>
<td>256 197</td>
<td>573 238</td>
<td>619 653</td>
<td>624 015</td>
<td>738 535</td>
<td>770 273</td>
<td>657 479</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>455 984</td>
<td>420 184</td>
<td>453 030</td>
<td>464 463</td>
<td>454 384</td>
<td>380 094</td>
<td>418 361</td>
<td>498 301</td>
<td>671 364</td>
<td>583 291</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>457 105</td>
<td>388 184</td>
<td>325 267</td>
<td>335 331</td>
<td>422 195</td>
<td>427 544</td>
<td>396 388</td>
<td>385 455</td>
<td>398 016</td>
<td>321 098</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>4 384 437</td>
<td>4 075 341</td>
<td>3 713 299</td>
<td>3 943 194</td>
<td>4 079 407</td>
<td>4 502 821</td>
<td>5 275 349</td>
<td>5 721 525</td>
<td>6 547 742</td>
<td>6 248 891</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viet Nam</td>
<td>1 484 283</td>
<td>1 823 102</td>
<td>2 044 630</td>
<td>2 203 499</td>
<td>2 450 112</td>
<td>2 765 365</td>
<td>3 379 955</td>
<td>3 790 167</td>
<td>4 559 252</td>
<td>4 311 738</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>12 333 673</td>
<td>12 625 677</td>
<td>13 072 193</td>
<td>14 183 355</td>
<td>16 538 512</td>
<td>18 265 269</td>
<td>21 296 339</td>
<td>22 782 378</td>
<td>25 931 643</td>
<td>24 975 674</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>19 180 315</td>
<td>19 080 287</td>
<td>19 639 424</td>
<td>20 723 532</td>
<td>24 152 599</td>
<td>26 441 934</td>
<td>29 181 224</td>
<td>31 364 641</td>
<td>35 060 764</td>
<td>34 250 929</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>55 815 226</td>
<td>56 600 344</td>
<td>58 692 736</td>
<td>64 295 442</td>
<td>71 854 220</td>
<td>79 073 528</td>
<td>86 492 565</td>
<td>94 050 735</td>
<td>102 598 051</td>
<td>96 691 761</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 3: Oil and Gas of the SCS countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Proven Oil Reserves (Billion Barrels)</th>
<th>Proven Gas Reserves (Trillion Cubic Feet)</th>
<th>Oil Production (Thousand Barrels/Day)</th>
<th>Gas Production (Billion Cubic Feet/Day)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brunei</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>203.5</td>
<td>366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>3,684.4</td>
<td>1,960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>4.37</td>
<td>93.9</td>
<td>892.5</td>
<td>2,613</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>83.0</td>
<td>750.8</td>
<td>2,218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>&lt;0.01</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>186.9</td>
<td>858</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>344.6</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>26.7</strong></td>
<td><strong>279.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>6,078.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>8,293</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>